Russia is likely teaching troops from China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) how to integrate some of the most advanced drone and counter-drone systems into land warfare during the Center-2026 strategic exercises, according to the Institute for the Study of War's (ISW) October 2 assessment — a transfer of hard-won battlefield lessons from Ukraine that Western analysts are watching closely.
A hands-on role, not just observation
The PLA reportedly sent a military contingent to the Russian-hosted Center-2026 Strategic Command and Staff exercise at the Chelyabinsk training ground in Chelyabinsk Oblast, held between September 28 and October 3. Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov said on October 2 that the exercises involved approximately 700 pieces of equipment, more than 600 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and over 60 unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs).
That scale matters. Chinese forces previously only observed the Zapad 2025 exercises; at Center-2026, Russian and Chinese forces practiced joint deployment and maneuvers together. ISW assessed that the PLA contingent is likely gaining valuable experience in launching and defending against first-person view (FPV) drone strikes, using ground robotics systems, observing electronic warfare techniques, and conducting the Russian-style small-group assault tactics developed in the war against Ukraine.
Lessons paid for in Ukraine
The curriculum on offer at Chelyabinsk was written on Ukrainian battlefields. Russia's army has spent more than four years learning — at enormous cost — how FPV drones, reconnaissance UAVs, electronic warfare and unmanned ground vehicles interact on a modern front line where almost every movement is observed and struck within minutes.
For China, access to that experience without fighting a war is strategically valuable. The PLA has invested heavily in unmanned systems, but it has not tested them in high-intensity combat. Training alongside Russian forces who have is the closest substitute available, and it deepens a military partnership that has steadily expanded since 2022 even as Beijing publicly maintains it is not a party to the war.
Why it matters beyond Ukraine
The assessment lands at a sensitive moment. Western governments have repeatedly accused Chinese firms of supplying dual-use goods that sustain Russia's defence industry, charges Beijing denies. Direct PLA participation in drone-warfare training on Russian soil goes beyond trade: it suggests operational learning is flowing between the two militaries in the very domain that has defined the Ukraine war.
ISW also noted that Russia's jet-powered Geran drone advantage over Ukraine is likely to last only until Ukrainian forces scale up interceptor drone production — Ukraine currently destroys about 57 percent of Russia's jet-powered drones, President Volodymyr Zelensky told the Financial Times, and is testing five interceptor models, with one expected to reach production of about 400 units by the end of October. The tactics and counter-tactics being refined in Ukraine are evolving monthly — and the PLA is now getting a front-row seat.
For Ukraine's supporters, the implication is uncomfortable but clear: the drone revolution their aid helped accelerate is being studied by the world's largest military. Keeping Ukraine's interceptor production and electronic-warfare edge ahead of that learning curve is becoming as important as the front line itself.
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